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FOREWORD
Armed unmanned aerial vehicles—combat
drones—have fundamentally altered the ways the
United States conducts military operations aimed
at countering insurgent and terrorist organizations.
Drone technology is on track to becoming an increasingly important part of the country’s arsenal,
as numerous unmanned systems are in development and will likely enter service in the future. The
increasingly frequent use of drones raises profound
questions about the nature and morality of warfare
involving asymmetrical risks between opposing belligerents. Concerned citizens, academics, journalists,
nongovernmental organizations, and policymakers
have raised questions about the ethical consequences
of drones and issued calls for their military use to be
strictly regulated. This level of concern is evidence
that the future of drone warfare not only hinges on
technical innovations, but also on careful analysis of
the moral and political dimensions of war. Regardless
of whether drones are effective weapons, it would be
difficult to sanction their use if they undermine the
legitimacy of U.S. military forces or compromise the
foundations of democratic government.
One key ethical challenge drones raise is that removing American soldiers from the battlefield could
alter civilians’ attitudes toward the use of military
force in ways that promote war and undermine democratic accountability. Casualty aversion, the civilian
public’s discomfort with sustaining military casualties
and resistance to costly military operations, is a powerful constraint on when and how wars are waged in
democratic societies. Political leaders in such polities,
and even some high-ranking commanders within the
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military, may feel pressured by public opinion to wage
wars in ways that minimize the risk to soldiers, or to
avoid fighting entirely when casualties are likely. One
of the most popular and plausible arguments against
the use of drones is that these weapons subvert the
constraints created by casualty aversion in potentially
dangerous ways. Drones may allow wars to be waged
without risk to human soldiers and therefore without
the risk of provoking public backlash. The weakening
of this constraint might permit leaders to initiate or escalate conflicts that, absent the availability of drones,
might generate domestic political controversy. In what
follows, Dr. Marcus Schulzke and Dr. James Walsh
discuss the logic of such arguments against drones,
and touch upon counterarguments which suggest that
drones might permit war to be waged in a more ethical manner than current weapons technologies permit.
Although the argument that drones will subvert
casualty aversion is one of the most common objections raised against these weapons, it has not been
subjected to much systematic empirical investigation.
It is generally substantiated with inferences drawn
from past wars and with theoretical accounts of how
drones may promote civic disengagement. The authors assess this argument with a survey experiment.
Participants were randomly assigned to read information about fictional conflict scenarios. These scenarios
varied the type of attack by U.S. forces, describing it as
drone strikes, strikes from manned aircraft, or the use
of ground troops. They also systematically altered the
strategic goals of the military mission, which included
counterterrorism, humanitarian intervention, the restraint of an aggressive foreign power, and support
for an ally facing an internal military threat to its hold
on power.
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Their results show that participants are more willing to support the use of force when it involves drone
strikes. Support for attacks increases noticeably when
it is described as a drone strike. However, this technology’s influence on support for military interventions may not be as profound as critics of drone warfare often argue. Indeed, one important shortcoming
of philosophical and ethical reflections on the effects
of drones is that they do not produce very precise
estimates about how sizable a change in opinion the
introduction of this technology will create. An important contribution, then, is to compare how drones alter
opinions compared to other factors known from existing research that alter support for the use of force.
For example, gender has an influence on support
for war that was comparable to using drones. Existing research suggests that gender has a consistent, but
not overwhelming, large effect on attitudes towards
military force. While one should use care in generalizing from the results of one experiment, these findings
suggest that the possibility of engaging in military action with drones should, in general, increase support
for the use of force by a modest amount. The practical
consequences of such changes would depend on how
closely the public was divided on a proposed military
mission.
Many factors are at play when leaders propose to
or actually use force. The availability of combat drones
may be one such factor, but that alone is unlikely to
be decisive in most scenarios. It also indicates that the
type of military action matters. Participants were more
likely to support wars that posed lower levels of risk
to American soldiers, but they were also more likely
to support wars in pursuit of important objectives (es-
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pecially for counterterrorism) and when they thought
that war was generally an effective foreign policy tool.
This suggests that critics of drones are correct in calling attention to the risk of drones lowering inhibitions
against war, but that this shift in attitudes alone is unlikely to have a strong effect on the incidence of wars.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
One of the most compelling arguments that has
been raised against drone weapons is that they may
lower inhibitions against going to war by making it
possible to fight without sustaining casualties. This
monograph assesses this argument by using a survey experiment designed to gauge whether American civilians are more willing to initiate wars using
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) than using ground
forces or piloted aircraft. The use of UAVs made participants more likely to support initiating a war, and
this was consistent across four principal policy objectives that were the cause for war: counterterrorism,
humanitarian intervention, foreign policy restraint,
and internal political change. However, the increase
in support for war caused by UAVs was fairly small,
and would probably not be sufficient to tip the balance of public opinion in favor of fighting under most
circumstances. Support for war was also heavily influenced by other factors, such as what principal policy
objective was being pursued.
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THE ETHICS OF DRONE STRIKES:
DOES REDUCING THE COST OF CONFLICT
ENCOURAGE WAR?
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Drones have had a revolutionary influence on
U.S. military operations over the past 2 decades. This
technology is on track to become an increasingly important part of the country’s arsenal as the dozens of
unmanned systems currently in development enter
service in the future. Drones have also raised profound questions about the nature of warfare and the
morality of fighting in ways that create asymmetrical
risks between opposing belligerents. Concerned citizens, academics, journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and policymakers have spoken out against
drones and called for them to be strictly regulated or
even prohibited.1 This level of public concern is evidence that the future of drone warfare not only hinges
on technical innovations, but also on careful analysis
of the moral and political dimensions of war. Regardless of whether drones are effective weapons, it would
be difficult to sanction their use if they undermine the
legitimacy of U.S. military forces or compromise the
foundations of democratic government.
One key challenge raised by many critics of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) specifically, and unmanned systems more generally, is that removing
American soldiers from the battlefield could disrupt
civilian attitudes toward the use of military force in
ways that promote war and undermine democratic accountability. Casualty aversion, which we understand
to be the civilian public’s discomfort with sustaining
military casualties and resistance against costly mili-
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tary operations, is a powerful constraint on when and
how wars are waged in democratic societies. Policymakers, and even some high-ranking commanders
within the military, may feel pressured by public
opinion to wage wars in ways that minimize the risk
to soldiers or to avoid fighting when casualties are
likely. One of the most popular and plausible arguments against the use of drones is that these weapons
subvert the constraints created by casualty aversion in
dangerous ways. Drones may allow wars to be waged
without risk to human soldiers and therefore without
the risk of provoking public backlash.
Although the argument that drones will subvert
casualty aversion is one of the most common objections raised against these weapons, it has not been
subjected to systematic empirical investigation. It is
generally substantiated with inferences drawn from
past wars and with purely theoretical accounts of how
drones may promote civic disengagement. We tested
this argument with survey experiments involving
over 3,000 participants in the United States recruited
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online labor market.
Participants were randomly assigned to read information about fictional conflict scenarios. These scenarios
varied the type of attack by U.S. forces, describing it
as drone strikes, strikes from manned aircraft, or the
use of ground troops. They also systematically altered
the strategic goals of the military mission, which included counterterrorism, humanitarian intervention,
the restraint of an aggressive foreign power, and foreign policy restraint, and support for an ally facing an
internal military threat to its hold on power.
Our results show that participants are more willing to support the use of force when it involves drone
strikes. Support for attacks increases noticeably when
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it is described as a drone strike. However, this technology’s influence on support for military interventions may not be as profound as critics of drone warfare often argue. Indeed, one important shortcoming
of philosophical and ethical reflections on the effects
of drones is that they do not produce very precise
estimates about how sizable a change in opinion the
introduction of this technology will create. One important contribution of our results, then, is to compare
how drones alter opinions compared to other factors
that we know from existing research alter support for
the use of force. Casualty aversion is one of several
considerations that affect support for war, such as
mission type and existing attitudes about war. Demographic characteristics like gender, race, income, and
age were also included in our analysis, with gender
having an influence on support for war that was comparable to using drones. Thus, participants were more
likely to support wars that posed lower levels of risk
to American soldiers, but they were also more likely
to support wars in pursuit of important objectives
(especially for counterterrorism), when they thought
that war was generally an effective foreign policy tool,
or when they were male. This suggests that critics of
drones are correct in calling attention to the risk of
drones lowering inhibitions against war, but that this
shift in attitudes is unlikely to have a strong effect on
the incidence of wars.
Our analysis proceeds in five stages. First, we provide an overview of the research on casualty aversion
and explore the reasons why low casualty tolerance
may limit wars in both jus ad bellum and jus in bello
senses. Second, we discuss arguments that drones
may circumvent casualty aversion in ways that lead to
an increased incidence of war and undermine demo-
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cratic accountability. We also raise the possibility that
lowering inhibitions against war could have beneficial
consequences by making it easier to engage in humanitarian interventions. Third, we explain our research
design and show how it improves on aggregate polling data when assessing support for military interventions involving drones. Fourth, we present our results
and discuss their implications for the debate over the
morality of drone warfare. Finally, we conclude by
considering some of the policy implications of our research and call attention to the importance of conducting further research on dimensions of this topic that
we were not able to test.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Drones have become the subject of intense debate
between those who think that the weapons raise serious ethical challenges that justify their prohibition and
those who believe they are ethically advantageous.
Much of this debate is focused on armed unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the Predator and Reaper, and on the permissibility of targeted killing. However, commentators have also made efforts to develop
general theories of drone ethics that account for other
kinds of unmanned vehicles that may enter service in
the near future. Some have even speculated about the
ethical implications of autonomous weapons,2 though
ethical analysis of autonomous weapons is hindered
by uncertainty about the meaning of autonomy and
whether the military would realistically develop
weapons that operate without human control.
Our analysis is primarily directed at the ethical
challenges posed by combat UAVs in particular, which
is defined as an airframe armed with air-to-ground
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weapons that is controlled remotely by a pilot who is
located outside of the combat zone. There are several
reasons for this. First, because UAVs are already being used and play a central role in American military
operations, the ethical issues they raise are more urgent than some of those associated with weapons that
are not yet in service or that have not been created.
Second, given the uncertainty about what form drones
will take in the future and what roles they will perform, it is difficult to develop experiments that will
reliably gauge public opinion about them. Finally, our
findings about UAVs may be generalizable to other
types of aerial drones, as well as to drones operating
on land and at sea, that have similar capacities for distancing their controllers from the battlefield and protecting them from being attacked. As discussed later,
there is good reason to believe that our findings related to UAVs will hold true for other types of drones.
Despite the broad range of issues taken up in the
debate over the ethics of drone warfare and the many
different perspectives that have been offered, one
question has emerged as a central point of contention:
will drones lower inhibitions against using military
force in future conflicts? Commentators on both sides
of the debate over drone use have reflected on this
question and given reasons for thinking that drones
may lower civilians’ inhibitions against fighting, raise
new ones, or fail to significantly alter them in one way
or another. With limited empirical data on drone usage available, most commentators have sought to substantiate their answers to this question by theorizing
the causal mechanisms that might account for drones
altering attitudes about the use of military force. Although the causal mechanisms that have been posited
in previous research cannot provide a clear answer to
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questions about the consequences of drone use, they
do provide a strong starting point for developing the
hypotheses that we will test.
Casualty Aversion as a Constraint on War.
By far the most common concern expressed by opponents of drone warfare is that drones may make it
easier to use military force by obviating the need for
risking human combatants’ lives in combat. This line
of argument generally starts from the premise that casualty aversion helps to constrain wars ad bellum and
in bello. From a jus ad bellum perspective, civilians may
anticipate the casualties that could be sustained in a
prospective war and oppose the use of military force
to avoid the loss of life. Civilian support for an ongoing war might also wane as losses mount, thereby
making it difficult to continue fighting in the aftermath
of costly actions. From a jus in bello perspective, civilians may oppose intensifying wars, extending them
geographically, or engaging in certain types of operations when these changes in the conduct of war may
result in heavy casualties. Low casualty tolerance may
therefore help to limit the occurrence of wars, compel
belligerents to seek peace more quickly, and prevent
conflict escalation.
There is a great deal of empirical support for the
belief that casualty aversion helps to prevent or constrain wars. Multiple studies have found evidence indicating that civilians, especially those who are citizens
of liberal democracies, tend to disapprove of wars that
result in heavy casualties.3 Other studies have made
the complementary discovery that democratic leaders are vulnerable to drops in public support that can
be triggered by costly wars.4 These findings also hold
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a great deal of intuitive appeal because they seem to
cohere with changes in public support for American
military ventures since World War II. For example,
low casualty tolerance explains how civilian opposition to U.S. military involvement in Vietnam and
Somalia, following costly combat operations like the
Tet Offensive and the Battle of Mogadishu, may have
precipitated withdrawals from those countries, even
when U.S. forces had a significant military advantage
over their opponents.
Some question the power of casualty aversion and
contend that there is not simply a linear increase of
opposition to war as more soldiers are wounded and
killed. Gelpi et al.5 argue that many considerations affect casualty tolerance, though the prospect of success
seems to be the most important:
[W]hen it comes to supporting an ongoing military
mission in the face of a mounting human toll, expectations of success matter the most. Many factors—the
stakes, the costs (both human and financial), the trustworthiness of the administration, the quality of public
consensus on the foreign policy goal in question, and
so on—affect the robustness of support. But the public’s expectation of whether the mission will be successful trumps other considerations.6

This suggests that casualty aversion may vary considerably, depending on the type of war being fought.
Others question the reality of casualty aversion
and contend that this phenomenon is largely based on
false perceptions. Eric Larson finds that:
[a]s a result of the Gulf War, the public does not expect—and is unlikely to demand—that all future U.S.
military operations be bloodless. Indeed, it is more
accurate to say that the public hopes for low-to-no casualty operations but fears a very different outcome.7
7

Similarly, Charles Hyde argues that casualty aversion
is a myth and says that “[t]he public has consistently
operated within the realm of an ends and means evaluation with significant cues from political leaders who
frame the public debate.”8 Casualty aversion may be
closely linked to media coverage that focuses disproportionately on anti-war sentiments when soldiers are
killed, as this kind of coverage may erode public support or create the false appearance of a drop in support even when real attitudes are fairly stable.9
Regardless of whether it is constant or variable,
real or imagined, casualty tolerance does seem to be
a consideration that civilian politicians and military
leaders bear in mind when considering how and when
to use military force.10 Even Hyde, who describes casualty aversion as a myth, finds that there is “strong
evidence that policymakers and senior military leaders believe the American public is casualty averse and
will not tolerate deaths except when vital interests are
at stake.”11 Low casualty tolerance may therefore be
expected to create ad bellum and in bello inhibitions
that limit the incidence of wars and their intensity
either because of direct pressure from the public or
because of a perceived risk of public opposition. In
either case, the resultant pressure may compel politicians and military leaders to seek nonmilitary strategies of conflict resolution or to at least use the utmost
restraint when fighting.
Drones and the Future of Risk-Free War.
To their critics, drones seem to circumvent the restrictions of casualty aversion. They make it safer for
armed forces to wage wars without exposing their soldiers to the hazards of the battlefield, thereby mitigat-
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ing the possibility that casualty aversion, whether real
or perceived, will influence the decisions of politicians
and military leaders. Moreover, critics worry that if
drones allow the U.S. military to wage wars free of the
risk of military casualties, they will further shift the
burdens of war onto foreign populations. This may
result in more wars, more foreign casualties, more environmental destruction, and more social and political
disruption in contested areas, all without provoking
much domestic opposition.
John Kaag and Sarah Kreps argue that “drones create a ‘moral hazard’ by shielding US citizens, politicians, and soldiers from the risks associated with targeted killings.”12 Without risk, civilians and soldiers
alike may be unable to understand the consequences
of war. This may lead them to see war as a cheap and
effective solution to complex political disputes that
could be more effectively solved through peaceful
means. The ethical principles that inform judgments
about war may even lose their power when these are
weighed against the compelling practical advantages
of using drones. Kaag and Kreps suggest that this
freedom from consequences may lower the threshold
for initiating wars and make it easier to sustain protracted wars that might otherwise be forced to a conclusion by declines in public support. They are also
concerned that drones may make it easier to wage
wars in ways that are ethically and legally questionable, as evidenced by the use of UAVs to carry out
targeted killings in countries with which the United
States is not at war.
By Kaag and Kreps’ estimation, the moral hazard
of drones is not merely a possibility, but a likely outcome given the incentive structure that shapes politicians’ decisions. Drones are attractive to politicians
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who may see war as a way of achieving their foreign
policy goals but whose power is threatened by any
shifts in public opinion that a costly war might cause.
The use of drones provides a win–win proposition
for the president, who could appear strong on defense
without responsibility for body bags coming home,
a development that would likely send his political
fortunes tumbling.13

Kaag and Kreps contend that politicians are likely to
increase their reliance on drone weapons over time,
since those who fail to do so will be met with public
opposition and risk losing office.
Even more seriously, Kaag and Kreps think that
the incentive structure drones create could ultimately
have deleterious effects on the U.S. Government by
making it possible for politicians to wage wars without securing public approval:
Ironically, the pressure from a democratic electorate
to protect itself from the harms of warfare will not
encourage policy makers to adopt peaceful or democratic methods . . . but rather methods of warfare that
leverage technology in order to insulate citizen-soldiers from harm. The irony is this insulation creates
the possibility that leaders will no longer, in a prudential sense, have to obtain popular permission to go
to war.14

The threat of de-democratization exacerbates the
potential problems associated with drone use and
suggests that even Americans who are unconcerned
with the effects U.S. military operations have abroad
should be alert to the possibility that overcoming casualty aversion could erode democratic governance.

10

Kaag and Kreps’ concern over the loss of democratic accountability builds on a point previously
made by P. W. Singer, who describes drones as being part of a larger process of de-democratizing war
as armed forces increasingly fight in ways that evade
public accountability.
Unmanned systems represent the ultimate break between the public and its military. With no draft, no
need for congressional approval (the last formal declaration of war was in 1941), no tax or war bonds, and
now the knowledge that the Americans at risk are
mainly just American machines, the already lowering
bars to war may well hit the ground. A leader needn’t
carry out the kind of consensus building that is normally needed before a war, and doesn’t even need to
unite the country behind the effort.15

Singer goes on to describe a collapse of civic engagement as the low costs of war lead decisions about
the use of military force to become routine policy decisions that provoke little serious public deliberation.
By his reasoning, drones will reduce war to a spectator activity as “the checks and balances that undergird
democracy go by the wayside.”16 Thus, like Kaag and
Kreps, Singer sees casualty aversion as a powerful
mechanism for limiting war that has implications for
reducing aggression and sustaining accountability.
Frank Sauer and Niklas Schörnig17 contend that
drones are attractive weapons for democratic states
for procedural and normative reasons. Procedurally, democratic leaders can be punished for waging
wars that result in heavy casualties by being removed
from office. This compels them to seek the least costly
methods of conflict resolution that are available and to
avoid war whenever possible. Normatively, democra-
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cies place a high value on human life, especially the
lives of their own citizens, which provides added incentive to avoid violence. Sauer and Schörnig argue
that these concurrent influences usually compel democracies to act peacefully, but that democracies may
escape these restrictions when they are able to wage
wars either without sustaining casualties or without
appearing to do so.
Many techniques are available to democracies attempting to minimize the costs of war. They can employ special operations forces or private military contractors that may suffer fewer or less visible casualties.
They can also launch guided missiles, which have the
advantage of not endangering human combatants on
the attacker’s side. However, Sauer and Schörnig describe drones as the “preferred solution” to the casualty tolerance problem because drones are relatively
cheap, do not put the military personnel operating
them at risk, and are militarily effective. Sauer and
Schörnig share Kaag and Kreps’ concern that drones
will make it easier for states to engage in risk-free warfare and to evade accountability. They also contend
that this problem is apt to follow a slippery slope. As
drones make wars safer for the militaries armed with
them, they will become more pervasive and more
autonomous, which will, in turn, lead to even lower
inhibitions against using force and increased demand
for drones.
Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun18 speculate
that drones could have the paradoxical effect of simultaneously making major wars less likely and small
wars more likely. Their reasoning is that drones alter
the considerations affecting the jus ad bellum principle
of last resort, which requires that states pursue all
available peaceful means of conflict resolution before
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employing military force. Drones help to prevent large
wars by giving states a capacity to carry out small
strikes that are less likely to provoke escalations than
combat between human soldiers. However, Brunstetter and Braun contend that drones may lead states to
deviate from the principle of last resort when power asymmetries make it possible to carry out drone
attacks without fear of reprisal. As they explain:
[t]he risk becomes that military leaders will bypass
nonlethal alternatives, such as apprehending alleged
terrorists and continued surveillance, and move
straight to extrajudicial killing as the standard way of
dealing with the perceived threat of terrorism.19

The perception that drones are more discriminate
than other weapons exacerbates this problem by making it possible to present drone strikes as a form of
controlled violence that is less serious than war.
Many other writers also express concerns about
drones’ effects on civilians’ attitudes about war,
though usually without going into as much detail
about the exact mechanisms underlying this process.
Linda Johansson argues that:
[w]eapons such as UAVs, that are perceived to provide an almost guaranteed upper hand, may also
make people believe that the war would be without
risk, at least regarding the number of casualties

and concludes that “[t]his might have an impact on
domestic opinion, and, in turn, lower the threshold of
entering and sustaining a war.”20 Christian Enemark21
likewise expresses concern over what war may be
like in the future as more states and nonstate actors
develop unmanned weapons.
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The prospect of increased availability of armed drones
warrants contemplation of a future in which the resort
to force is less constrained by the expectation of loss,
and this sits uneasily with ethical principles that have
traditionally set a high threshold for going to war.22

Enemark argues that drones have already demonstrated this capacity for lowering inhibitions against
war and that this is evidenced by the U.S. preemptive
war against potential terrorist threats.23
David Dunn24 reflects on the way drones have altered casualty calculations in the War on Terror, with
the effect of incentivizing more lethal strategies.
By disembodying these weapons platforms, the technology enables their use with domestic political impunity, minimal international response and low political risk and cost. It is now politically and technically
easier to kill suspected terrorists than to arrest them.25

Boyle26 raises a similar point by suggesting that superpowers that were once afraid to fight each other for
fear of triggering nuclear war might suddenly find it
easier to come into conflict using drones. He reasons
that drones could cause subtle provocations, such as
reconnaissance missions and small attacks, that would
risk escalating into more serious confrontations. Finally, Gurcan27 argues that drones may make deterrence
more difficult, as aggressors armed with drones may
not be easy to intimidate if they can fight without sustaining casualties. This reasoning indirectly relies on
assumptions about casualty aversion, since one of the
goals of deterrence may be to convince civilian populations that a prospective war will be too costly to be
worthwhile.
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Can Risk-Free War be Ethically Advantageous?
Many commentators who defend drones agree
with critics in thinking that drones may circumvent
casualty aversion, yet they draw much different conclusions from this premise. Rather than seeing the
decline in military casualties as a mechanism for overcoming inhibitions against the use of military force,
defenders of drones tend to think that lower casualty
rates will make it easier to promote compliance with
the norms of just war. Zach Beauchamp and Julian
Savulescu28 give two reasons for thinking that lowering the threshold for initiating wars may be a positive
development. First, this may make states more inclined to fight humanitarian conflicts. If states do not
have to risk their own forces, they will be free to wage
benevolent wars that do not yield strategic benefits
without facing public backlash. Second, Beauchamp
and Savulescu argue that being freed from the fear
of sustaining casualties will allow intervening states
to show higher levels of restraint when fighting. This
lends additional support to the use of drones in humanitarian wars, as it suggests that drones may be
used in ways that coincide with the values of human
security and respect for civilian immunity, which help
to justify humanitarian missions.
The points raised by Beauchamp and Savulescu,
particularly the second, coincide with those made by
others who think that drones can be ethically advantageous. Strawser29 argues that armed forces have an obligation, which he calls the Principle of Unnecessary
Risk, to prevent their personnel from being exposed
to avoidable risks. By this account, it would be unethical for armed forces that have drone technology to fail
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to use this technology as a way of protecting soldiers.
Moreover, Bradley Strawser and others call attention
to the benefits this may have for civilians. Freeing
armed forces from the concern over sustaining casualties could allow them to establish much stricter rules
of engagement that might help to reduce violence
against civilians.30 Drones do not face the same need
to act in self-defense as human combatants do. Their
operators could be prohibited from using lethal force
whenever there is a high risk of inadvertently harming
civilians without raising any corresponding danger to
military personnel. Drones might therefore be a way
of escaping the ethical dilemma of whether to prioritize force protection or civilian protection, which has
hitherto presented an insurmountable challenge for
just war theorists.31
These arguments in defense of drones show that
any effect these weapons have on casualty aversion
can be read in much different ways, depending on
whether casualty aversion is seen as a constraint on
war or a way of facilitating the just conduct of wars.
This makes it vital for analyses of how drones influence casualty tolerance to account for the different
types of wars that drones may be used in, as well as
whether drones are used in ways that increase or decrease the risks to civilians. We do this in our experiments by testing support for drone strikes, air strikes,
and ground attacks in pursuit of four different principal policy objectives: foreign policy restraint, counterterrorism, humanitarian intervention, and internal political change. Before turning to these experiments, we
first discuss how some of the points raised earlier are
reflected in public opinion surveys regarding the conflict with the Islamic State armed group in 2014. The
debate about American military intervention against
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the Islamic State included discussions not only of the
wisdom of intervening, but also the merits of different types of military action. It thus provides a contemporary opportunity to assess how the availability of
drone technology influences public attitudes.
Public Opinion and the Islamic State.
The United States experienced public debates
about the wisdom of American action against Islamic
State militants in Iraq and Syria during the summer
and fall of 2014. Much of this debate centered on the
type of military action, if any, the United States should
undertake. A number of public opinion organizations polled representative samples of the American
public and asked the degree to which they favored
or opposed a range of steps being considered by the
United States.
Consider the data in Figure 1, which summarizes
responses to questions about favoring or opposing
different types of intervention in the conflict. A sizable
majority of respondents favored air strikes in Syria and
in Iraq, while far fewer supported the introduction of
American ground troops. This is consistent with the
argument that technologies that reduce the costs of
conflict by placing fewer military personnel at risk of
harm, such as drones and air power, should lead to
increased support for the use of force. Note, however,
that the option of sending military advisors to Iraq receives almost as much support as does the use of air
power. This is a bit puzzling from this perspective, as
military advisors may be in proximity to Iraqi ground
troops who engage in combat. Note as well that training and equipping rebels in Syria, which presumably
would not risk combat by Americans, receives consid-
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erably less support. Why might this be the case? One
explanation might be that the public also incorporates
its beliefs about the likelihood that the use of force
will succeed in achieving its goals against its human
and financial costs. It is possible that respondents recognized that sending military advisors to Iraq would
place them in harm’s way, but balanced this against
the belief that advisors could bolster the effectiveness
of Iraqi ground units against the rebels. They may also
have concluded that arming Syrian rebels, who had
proven incapable of either overthrowing the Assad
regime or stopping the rise of the Islamic State, would
be an ineffective strategy.

Notes: Data from CBS/The New York Times public opinion survey released September 17, 2014. Totals do not equal 100 due to
rounding.

Figure 1. Support for Military Action,
September 2014.
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Some evidence for this comes from comparing the
information in Figures 2 and 3, which summarize responses to questions about preferences for different
combinations of air power. Figure 2 depicts responses
to questions that asked respondents if they favored the
use of drones and manned aircraft in striking the Islamic State. Drone strikes received considerably more
support than attacks from manned aircraft, which is
consistent with the argument that reducing the costs
of war increases support for the use of force. From this
perspective, though, the results of a poll conducted at
approximately the same time are surprising. As can
be seen in Figure 3, a much higher percentage of respondents prefer strikes from platforms that do not
risk American lives—drones and cruise missiles—
than from piloted aircraft. However, an even larger
percentage prefer strikes from both types of weapons
systems. This might be because such combined strikes
are seen as more effective than the use of only one
weapons system.

Notes: Data from CBS/The New York Times public opinion
survey released June 23, 2014.

Figure 2. Preferences for Strikes from Manned
Aircraft and Drones, June 2014.
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No Airstrikes

Don't Know/
No Answer

Notes: Data from Quinnipiac public opinion survey released
July 3, 2014.

Figure 3. Preferences for Strikes from Manned
Aircraft and Drones, June 2014.
This public opinion data, then, does not reveal an
obvious pattern in which attacks that reduce the likelihood of an important cost of war—military casualties—receive more public support. It is important to
recognize, though, that such polls are not really designed to directly assess specific propositions about
how changes in the costs of war influence attitudes.
To see why this is the case, return to Figure 1. We suggested that one reason respondents in this survey expressed strong preferences for sending military advisors to Iraq was that they believed that doing so would
increase the combat effectiveness of Iraqi units while
exposing American military personnel to acceptably
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small risks of harm. But other interpretations are plausible; for example, perhaps many respondents believe
that advisors would face very small risks roughly
equal to those of aircraft crews launching attacks in
uncontested air space. The questions in this and most
public opinion surveys are intended to measure support for various options, not to assess directly why
respondents express the preferences that they do. Yet
doing so is important for establishing which of the
propositions about how changes in the cost of conflict
influence public support for the use of force. In the
next section, we argue that an experimental approach
is better-suited for this purpose, and summarize results from a series of experiments that are designed to
directly test such propositions.
Survey Experiment.
To answer these types of questions, we conducted
a survey experiment in early 2015. This experiment recruited participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
online labor market. Mechanical Turk is an inexpensive and flexible way to enlist participants, and has
become a widely used tool among social scientists.32
Respondents were randomly assigned to read a mock
news story describing plans by the United States to
use military force overseas.33 Random assignment to
these “treatments” is a key part of the experiment. It
allows us to assume that the characteristics of individuals assigned to read each news story are not systematically different from each other. This means that
we can expect that any differences in the attitudes that
people assigned to different treatments are due to the
content of the news stories.34
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The news stories varied two elements (see the Appendix for the complete wording of each treatment as
well as the questions that comprise the survey instrument). The first was the type of military action. This
could take one of three forms: a drone strike, an air
strike from a piloted aircraft, or the use of ground
troops. Consistent with the casualty aversion idea discussed earlier, the news stories had different information about the risk that American military personnel
would face. The drone treatments stated that “the use
of unmanned drones means that no American military personnel would be placed at risk.” The air strike
treatments, in contrast, included information that
the target of the strikes were believed to lack weapons capable of attacking aircraft, suggesting a low
possibility of military casualties. The ground troops
news stories did not mention if these troops faced any
danger or not.
The second element that varied across the treatments was the purpose or goal of the use of force.
Here, we follow in the footsteps of important work
on public opinion and foreign policy which finds that
preferences differ in important ways depending on
the “principle policy objective” of the use of force.35
The treatments in our news story vary four such objectives. The first is counterterrorism, in which attacks
are planned on militants who have in the past attacked the United States. The second is foreign policy
restraint, where the United States seeks to punish a
foreign state for threatening a key interest, in this case
the shipment of petroleum from the Persian Gulf to
world markets. The third is humanitarian intervention, in which American military force has the objective of stopping mass killings in a foreign country. The
final objective is internal political change, aimed at
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preventing the violent overthrow of a foreign government by its internal opponents. Our mock news stories are modeled closely on those of Gelpi, Feaver, and
Reifler36 and use the country of Yemen as the location
of the use of force.
Combining these two elements—type and objective
of military force—produces a total of 12 treatments.
Roughly 300 participants were randomly assigned to
read each of these stories. They then answered questions about their reactions to the planned use of force,
including the degree to which they supported the attack; their estimates of the number of military casualties that would result if the attack were carried out;
general attitudes regarding the wisdom of the use of
force; and demographic questions such as party identification, age, gender, and so on.
To this point, we have argued that military casualties are a very important cost of conflict that influences attitudes regarding the wisdom of using force.
Our experiment is designed to alter systematically the
likelihood of such casualties. We expect that participants in the experiment will expect the lowest number
of military casualties from a drone strike, since these
news stories make explicit the fact that military personnel will face no risk of physical harm. Treatments
involving air strikes should lead to higher expectations of military casualties. Even though these treatments state that the target of the attack is not believed
to have weapons capable of threatening military aircraft, participants might still expect that the chance of
military casualties could be higher since such aircraft
do place military personnel in a battle zone. Participants might worry that the target has, unknown to the
United States, acquired anti-aircraft weapons, or that
casualties could result if the aircraft were to malfunc-
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tion over enemy territory. Participants’ expectations
of military casualties should be highest in the treatments that describe the attack as being carried out
by ground troops. Although these news stories make
no mention of the risks that military personnel face
in such situations, it should be straightforward for
participants to infer such risks from the information
they read.
To assess how assignment to different treatments
influenced estimates of military casualties, participants were asked if they expected no casualties, between 1 and 10 casualties, or between 11 and 100 casualties. The black dots in Figure 4 display the average
responses to these questions for each treatment; the
lines connected to each dot indicate the 95 percent confidence interval surrounding these averages. We see
a pattern, consistent with our expectations, in which
participants assigned to the drone strike treatments
expected the fewest casualties, followed by those assigned to air strike treatments and then the ground
troop treatments. Differences across treatments for the
same mission objective are sizable and statistically significant. Furthermore, differences across treatments
for the same type of attack are not statistically different from each other. This suggests that the information
in the treatments influenced participants’ expectations
of the costs of conflict in terms of military casualties.
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Figure 4. Expectation of Military Casualties.
But do such differences matter for support for
the use of force? To answer this question, we asked
participants to indicate the degree to which they supported the military action described in the news story
they read. Participants could strongly disapprove,
somewhat disapprove, somewhat approve, or strongly approve of the attack. The average responses (and
confidence intervals) for this question are depicted
in Figure 5. Drones lower inhibitions against initiating armed conflicts, as many critics of this technology
have predicted. Respondents were consistently more
likely to favor the use of UAVs over ground forces in
each of the experiments, regardless of the objectives
being pursued. They were also more willing to initiate
conflicts using drones than piloted aircraft, except in
humanitarian interventions. Furthermore, the consistent preference for air strikes over attacks involving
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ground forces provides evidence that support for a
prospective operation generally increases as the likelihood of sustaining military casualties decreases. This
indicates that American civilians are more inclined to
support using weapons that reduce the risk of military
casualties, regardless of whether UAVs are available,
and that other weapons that allow U.S. forces to manage risks may produce similar shifts in support for
launching an attack.

Figure 5. Support for the Use of Force.
Nevertheless, the differences between levels of support for the three tactics are rather small. Respondents
were more likely to favor attacks involving UAVs over
attacks involving piloted aircraft or ground forces, but
on average differences in these treatments reduced the
average degree of support from just below “somewhat
approve” towards “somewhat disapprove.” These
small absolute changes in public support for the three
tactics suggests that, although UAVs may be expected
26

to lower inhibitions against initiating wars by shielding American soldiers from risk, they are unlikely
to increase dramatically the incidence of fighting as
some critics of drone warfare have suggested. This
is evidence that drones do raise legitimate concerns
about attitudes toward initiating hostilities, but that
these concerns must be stated far more modestly and
that greater attention must be given to how support
for drone use varies depending on the context.
Choosing to use drones instead of piloted aircraft
or ground troops may be expected to provide a small
increase in public support for a prospective war. Even
a small change could have a decisive influence on the
overall level of public support for war if the country
is narrowly divided. In other words, deciding to use
drones to carry out an attack could tip the balance of
a nearly even division between pro-war and anti-war
attitudes toward the former position. On the other
hand, if opposition to war outweighs support, then it
appears that the use of drones to fight without the risk
of incurring casualties would be insufficient to sway
public opinion to support an attack. The slight influence on attitudes toward the initiation of hostilities
suggests that although drones may diffuse concerns
about sustaining casualties, they are unlikely to have
a significant effect on the incidence of wars. It seems
that unpopular wars will remain unpopular even if
drones are able to reduce the level of opposition to
fighting.
Another way to assess the substantive influence of
drones is to compare their effect to other factors that
influence support for the use of force. Figures 6 to 9
undertake such comparisons. Each figure reports the
coefficients and associated confidence intervals for a
regression model using support for the use of force as
the dependent variable. The independent variables in
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each model include whether or not the participant was
assigned to read a story about a drone strike, whether
or not the participant read about an air strike, and the
party identification, gender, race, income, and age of
the participant. All of these variables were rescaled to
range from zero to 1. This means that we can compare
the coefficients directly to each other. The dots indicate how increasing the independent variable from its
minimum to its maximum value influences support for
the use of force. For example, the coefficient for drone
strike indicates how much support changes when the
participant reads about the use of a UAV compared
to the use of ground troops, while the coefficient for
air strike indicates the change in support when the
participant is assigned to a treatment describing such
an attack. Similarly, the coefficient for the female variable indicates the change in support when the participant is a woman compared to a male participant.
The figure for party identification indicates the difference between participants that self-identify as “strong
Democrat” and “strong Republican.”37

Figure 6. Coefficients for Counterterrorism
Treatments.
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Figure 7. Coefficients for Foreign Policy Restraint
Treatments.

Figure 8. Coefficients for Humanitarian
Intervention Treatments.
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Figure 9. Coefficients for Internal Political Change
Treatments.
We see that the effect of describing an attack as a
drone strike is roughly similar in magnitude to the effect of gender, and smaller or about the same size as
party identification. Both of these factors have wellestablished influences on support for the use of force
and attitudes towards public policy more generally.
Pamela Conover and Virginia Sapiro38 find that gender
is one of the most consistent and powerful influences
on attitudes regarding military action.39 Similarly, a
large number of studies have concluded that party
identification has been shown to have a large effect on
attitudes towards many types of public policy.40 The
fact that the substantive influence of drone strikes,
compared to ground troops, is of a similar size to the
effects of gender and party identification indicates
that this weapon could have an effect on attitudes that
matters at the margin.
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In practice, the effects of the slight shifts in public
opinion that may be produced by using ground forces, piloted aircraft, or drones may not directly affect
whether a particular war is waged. Decisions about
initiating wars are not made directly by the American
public but rather by elected officials whose decisions
may be insulated from citizens’ attitudes or unresponsive to them. Thus, public opinion will matter to the
extent that changes in it can influence policymakers
and alter their decisions. Voters may decide to punish
policymakers who wage unpopular wars by removing
them from office.41 However, it seems unlikely that the
shifts in public opinion that may be caused by using
UAVs instead of ground forces or piloted aircraft will
always have great influence on policymakers’ decisions if they are determined to go to war. An increase
in opposition may not greatly influence a policymaker’s election prospects, especially when it is
weighed against other decisions that person has made
and that will also influence voter preferences.
The effect UAVs have on support for war is likely
to make them attractive weapons for politicians who
are concerned with maintaining their approval ratings during conflicts. The shift in public support that
drones produce may not be enormous and may not be
sufficient to cause a decisive change in the balance of
public opinion about a war, yet it is nevertheless just
one of the many advantages that make drones attractive weapons. As Sauer and Schörnig correctly point
out, there are multiple reasons for preferring drones
over other weapons and tactics, such as their ability to
loiter over targets and their comparatively low cost.42
Nevertheless, based on our experiment, it appears that
the predictions Singer43 and Kaag and Kreps44 make
about drones undermining democratic accountabil-
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ity are probably too strong. Because drones produce
moderate increases in support for war, greater reliance on them will probably be unable to silence antiwar voices. At least some politicians will continue to
have strong incentives to pursue peaceful strategies of
conflict resolution in an effort to satisfy those citizens
who are unwilling to support military operations even
if they exact a low human cost.
The pattern that is evident in the levels of support
for using drones, piloted aircraft, and ground forces
shows that there is a continuum of support for military force that extends across the range of weapons
and tactics that may be employed. One possibility for
future research is to include a more diverse assessment
of the weapons and tactics used by the U.S. military to
see the extent to which this pattern is sustained. There
may be gradations of support between the three types
of attacks we explore. For example, support for the
use of special operations forces could fall somewhere
between support for an attack involving conventional
ground forces and an air strike. Alternatively, it is possible that support for war could further diminish or
increase as other weapons and tactics are introduced.
The deployment of large numbers of soldiers to directly engage in combat could be less popular than the
deployment of smaller numbers of soldiers serving in
advisory roles.
Nevertheless, it seems that our study has reached
a limit when it comes to how drones may increase
support for war by circumventing casualty aversion.
The UAVs that were discussed in our experiments
provide their pilots with complete protection against
harm, as the pilots are removed from the battlefield
and cannot be injured by any attacks on their aircraft.
Other types of drones, such as semi-autonomous and
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autonomous drones, may reduce human involvement in attacks and alter public support for war, yet
they will not do this by influencing casualty calculations. After all, more advanced drones will not be able
to offer additional protection for American personnel
who are already far away from the battlefield. This indicates that other types of drones may produce slight
change in public support for using military force that
are comparable to the shifts produced by UAVs.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFLICT TYPE
The principal policy objective was an important
predictor of participants’ willingness to conduct
military operations. Participants were most likely to
support the use of ground troops, piloted aircraft, or
drones in counterterrorism operations, a finding consistent with earlier research.45 The willingness to support the use of force against terrorists seems to reflect
the perceived threat that terrorism poses to national
security, as well as the sense that the United States is
actively engaged in a War on Terror, in which terrorists are legitimate military targets. Higher support for
using drones against terrorists demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between objections to how
UAVs are used to conduct targeted killings against
terrorists and how they are used in other contexts.
The higher levels of support for all three tactics in
counterterrorism strikes is also evidence that many
of the trends in U.S. military operations that critics
have cited as being byproducts of drone use may be
more accurately described as being byproducts of the
War on Terror that may change if the U.S. military’s
objectives change.
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The other three principal policy objectives involved attacks on less immediate threats against enemies that the United States was not actively fighting when the experiments were conducted. In these
instances, fewer respondents were willing to support
a war, even if it could be waged with minimal risk
to American soldiers. This supports previous research
by Bruce Jentleson,46 who found that Americans were
more likely to support attacks when an “adversary
had gone beyond simply posing a standing threat and
initiated aggressive actions against American interests
or citizens” and that the public was not likely to support military operations that were directed at preventing future threats or remaking foreign governments.
The effect of conflict type on support for war suggests that the perceived necessity and morality of war
matter to the American public, with more serious
threats lowering inhibitions against using any type of
force even as considerations about the expected number of American military casualties help to determine
how an attack should be carried out. The implication
here is that the use of drones is more likely to contribute to the case for initiating war when policymakers
can connect drone strikes to plausible enemy threats.
The framing of attacks will therefore help to determine
whether drones will contribute to a greater incidence
of wars.
The varying levels of support for attacking under
differing circumstances provide additional evidence
that the effects of circumventing casualty aversion
with weapons that reduce the likelihood of casualties
will be fairly modest. Avoiding American military casualties is just one of the considerations that go into
deciding whether to fight, and it may not even be
the most salient one. It is also important to note that,
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despite the differing levels of support for each type
of conflict, participants’ attitudes toward the use of
military force were generally moderate. The average
responses consistently fell between the “somewhat
approve” and “somewhat disapprove” evaluations.
The participants’ general lack of strong attitudes
for or against war indicates that participants took a
pragmatic attitude toward use of force decisions, according to which attacks are supported or opposed as
considerations relating to their necessity, prospective
costs, and ethicality change.
Perhaps the most surprising discovery was that
support for air strikes in humanitarian interventions
surpassed support for UAV strikes. This was the one
instance in which the results deviated from the pattern
of decreasing levels of support as military personnel
were at a higher risk of being killed or injured. It is
difficult to determine why this anomaly exists given
the available information, especially since this pattern
deviates so clearly from the results relating to other
principal policy objectives. Because the pattern was
present in experiments involving participants with
high and low military assertiveness, this preference
does not appear to be affected by militaristic attitudes.
The different pattern here may be an indication that
respondents were evaluating humanitarian interventions according to different criteria than those they
applied to other principal policy objectives.
What is clear is that the greater support for air
strikes, rather than drones, in humanitarian interventions conflicts with Beauchamp and Savulescu’s47 contention that drones might lower casualty aversion in
morally advantageous ways. They argue that drones
could promote support for humanitarian interventions by reducing the costs those operations may have
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on armed forces that conduct them for benevolent motives and without any expectation of compensation.
Because support for humanitarian intervention is
highest when piloted aircraft are used, it appears that
these would be the optimal weapons to employ when
intervening and that drones’ effects on casualty aversion may only be significant when the only alternative
is the more costly use of ground forces. Of course, this
may not be true for the many other countries that are
developing drone weapons and that may use them
in humanitarian missions. It is therefore important
to withhold judgment on whether Beauchamp and
Savulescu’s argument is accurate in general and to
continue testing it in future research.
CONCLUSION
Our experiment has important implications for
members of the military and policymakers. Although
the American military plays only an advisory role
in decisions to initiate wars, it unavoidably affects
policymakers’ calculations about the use of military
force and is, in turn, affected by the choices made by
policymakers and the American public. Policymakers may have the ultimate control over when wars are
declared, but political calculations are affected by the
military’s decisions to develop certain offensive capacities, as well as its ability to realize those capacities
in practice. Members of the military have a large stake
in decisions about the resort to war, as they will be the
ones who bear the greatest burdens during a conflict.
Our results show that drones are unlikely to dramatically change calculations about initiating war in ways
that would increase the incidence of fighting, yet the
noticeable shifts in public opinion when using drones
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compared to other weapons reveals that the possibility of drones contributing to the overall case for military interventions cannot be disregarded.
The U.S. military has responsibilities to its soldiers,
civilian policymakers, and the American public that
could potentially come into conflict when using drone
weapons. In a sense, the concern that drones could
lower inhibitions against the use of force is a concern
that politicians or members of the military may violate public trust by waging unnecessary or aggressive
wars. The military could inadvertently fail in its responsibility to protect the American public if it develops weapons that ultimately increase the prevalence
of war, especially if wars are economically costly or
increase the likelihood of future attacks against the
United States. At the same time, the military has an
obligation to protect its personnel from the dangers
of the battlefield to the greatest extent possible, which
will inevitably provide grounds for making greater
use of drones and other remote weapons.
Our results demonstrate that these obligations are
not perfectly aligned; there is some tension between
responsibilities toward American civilians and responsibilities toward American soldiers. Relying on
drones to help protect soldiers from harm generally
increases support for war in ways that could influence on the decision to use military force when public
opinion is narrowly divided and politicians are highly
sensitive to it. Although this is a fairly remote possibility given the complex assortment of motives that
affect civilians’ attitudes and policymakers’ insulation
from public pressure when initiating wars, it is an important possibility for members of the military to bear
in mind. Decisions to expand the U.S. military’s drone
force and to employ this technology in a greater range
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of combat roles should be made with some sense of
how developing certain technical capacities might
alter future decisions to initiate wars.
Although our experiment focused on the UAVs
that are currently used by the U.S. Air Force and
Central Intelligence Agency, the results speak to concerns that will affect the Army as it develops new
unmanned weapon systems and prepares to deploy
them in future conflicts. The Army has consistently
worked towards improving its ethical standards since
the Vietnam War, as evidenced by its continual reevaluations of ethics education, its efforts to promote core
values, and the Center for the Army Profession and
Ethics’ work developing more effective ethical training tools.48 As the Army strives to protect its values
and promote ethical conduct in the future, it will be
important for it to remain aware of the importance of
ensuring that its efforts to improve force protection do
not create new ethical challenges. Most of all, it must
ensure that it protects American soldiers to the highest degree possible and improves its offensive capacities without inadvertently creating technologies that
conflict with its other responsibilities.
To a large extent, this will be a matter of effective
public diplomacy. The Army is sensitive to the demands of engaging with civilian audiences and shaping their attitudes about the Army and its mission.49
A central part of this public diplomacy is the display
of new weapons technologies and efforts to attract
recruits who can operate them. The risk of inadvertently lowering barriers against war is not only linked
to drones themselves but also to how drones are perceived. That is to say, the risk critics of drone warfare
call attention to is the danger that a lack of American
casualties will be confused with a sanitization of war

38

even as wars continue to inflict terrible human suffering. The Army has an important role to play in presenting information about drones and informing the
public about their associated risks and benefits. In
particular, the Army should help to ensure that the
American public does not lose sight of the fact that,
despite the benefits drones bring in terms of force protection and offensive power, wars remain extremely
destructive activities that must be waged for the right
reasons and only as a last resort.
Policymakers face a different set of ethical challenges when it comes to developing and using drones.
Although drones are unlikely to produce the kind of
profound civic disengagement in military decisions
that critics of drone warfare fear, these weapons nevertheless exert some influence on support for war,
which could help policymakers build the case for war
and escape a public backlash against costly military
operations. Drones will be particularly important
when they are used in conjunction with other strategies for justifying a war—for example, if a prospective
military venture can be framed as a counterterrorism
operation. This should not be considered a purely
good or bad outcome. In some instances, war may be
warranted and helping politicians make the case for
war will be morally advantageous. At other times, a
war may fail to pass jus ad bellum standards and any
effect drones have in lowering inhibitions against
fighting will be morally harmful.
Decisions about whether a war should be waged
must be made on a case-by-case basis, which makes it
impossible to pass final judgment on drones as being
purely good or bad weapons. However, our results
suggest that drones make other jus ad bellum considerations more important than ever. Differences in the
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principal policy objectives in our experiment showed
that the perceived legitimacy and urgency of military
intervention affected support for initiating hostilities.
Unlike drones, which can lower inhibitions against
fighting in just or unjust wars, principal policy objectives are central to determining whether war is justified. This makes it vital for policymakers to formulate
just principal policy objectives and to state openly the
principal policy objectives they are pursuing so these
can be evaluated by the American public. It is critical to note that drawing out the implications of our
findings for the military and policymakers will also
depend on further research about how drones affect
public opinion. The concern over drones evading the
restrictive effects of casualty aversion can be extended
to foreign civilians. Foreign civilian casualties may
erode support for war just as military casualties do.50
Members of the public may lose interest in wars that
appear to be misdirected at innocent people or that
inflict disproportionate civilian “collateral damage.”
This could give states an incentive to fight in ways
that minimize the risk to foreign civilians just as they
have an incentive to minimize military casualties.
However, in this context the concern expressed by
critics of drone warfare is not that drones will actually
lower civilian casualty rates, as they may for military
personnel, but that drones will give the appearance of
reducing civilian victimization even as the increased
incidence of war and new methods of fighting put
civilians at greater risk than ever.
Kaag and Kreps51 raise this challenge by suggesting that drones’ impressive technical capacities may
give the misleading impression that wars are being
waged with greater attention to the jus in bello principles of proportionality and discrimination. This could,
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in turn, affect citizens’ judgments relating to jus ad bellum. After all, if drones appear to improve compliance
with the in bello rules of war, then they could also make
the decision to wage war seem less morally significant.
Drones might even give the appearance that the only
casualties of war are enemy combatants. Closely related to this is the suspicion that the U.S. Government
may already be underreporting the civilian casualties
inflicted by drone strikes in an effort to make these
strikes appear to be an attractive alternative to other
types of military operations.52 By this account, drones
may be ethically objectionable because they facilitate
dissimulation more than other weapons.
Several studies found that public opinion does not
seem to be strongly affected by the suffering of foreign civilian populations.53 There is evidence to show
that democracies can inflict heavy foreign civilian casualties, and even target civilians, without sustaining
any serious crises of public confidence.54 This research
would suggest that drones’ capacities for creating the
appearance of minimal civilian harm are relatively unimportant. After all, if public opinion is not sensitive
to civilian casualties, then there is little reason to think
that drones may reduce inhibitions against fighting by
hiding those casualties.
Research that is focused specifically on drone
strikes that harm civilians suggest that the apparent
insensitivity to foreign civilian casualties has been
overstated. Kreps55 argues that the extent to which civilian casualties undermine support for drone strikes
has been underestimated in polls and that it is stronger
than the available data would suggest. She substantiates this with experiments that show how different
ways of framing polling questions may elicit greater
sensitivity to civilian casualties. Walsh56 finds that the
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anticipated number of civilian casualties has a powerful influence on attitudes toward drone strikes—even
exceeding the intolerance for sustaining military casualties—and that sensitivity to civilian casualties appears to be higher when they are inflicted using precision weapons. This is evidence that the use of drones
and other precision weapons may prime people to
expect lower civilian casualty rates and cause them to
adjust their willingness to condone them.
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